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ABSTRACT 
Why the number of banking relationships per firm varies so much across space? Is it 
simply due to microeconomic features of firms localized in different regions or is 
there instead something connected to microeconomics and macroeconomic factors? 
Can the institutional endowment of a region affect the number of bank-firm 
relationships? We seek to answer these questions with reference to the Italian case, 
one particularly interesting because of the substantial institutional gap between 
Center-North and South and the high average number of banking relationships per 
firm. We investigate the role of institutional quality in determining firms’ choices 
and, consistent with previous studies, find that institutions are a basic determinant of 
the observed differentials in the number of firms’ banking relationships among 
different Italian provinces. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, the literature has paid great attention to the widespread use of multiple 
relationship banking. In almost all countries, even relatively small firms borrow from several banks 
at the same time. Thus, even if the distribution of the number of banking relationships per firm 
substantially varies across countries, the lending relationship often consists of many banks. Ongena 
and Smith (2000), using a dataset of 1079 large firms from 20 European countries, document that 
single-bank relationships are relatively rare and Italy – with an average number of 15 banking 
relationships per firm - is the country where the phenomenon of multiple borrowing is most 
common. This is confirmed by Detragiache et al. (2000) who, dealing with a sample of small firms 
in the United Stated and Italy, show that single banking is relatively prevalent in the United States, 
even if the median number of relationships is 2, and 55,5% of firms deal with more than one bank. 
The case of Italy is more remarkable: 89 percent of firms rely on multiple banking, the median 
number of relationships is 5, and the 75th percentile is 8 (against only 2 in the United States). 
To better understand the reasons behind this wide heterogeneity in firms’ preferences on the 
number of banking relationships, many economic motivations have been set forth. A number of 
contributions have focused on the microeconomic aspects of individual choice, the role of firms’ 
features such as size, age, propensity to innovate, the endowment of human capital, the amount of 
R&D investment, and so forth. Theory predict that larger and older, more innovative and financially 
distressed firms (Horoff and Korting, 1998b) are more likely to resort to multiple bank 
relationships. On the empirical ground, some evidence shows that multiple relationships are 
associated with higher borrower riskiness (Foglia et al., 1998), while other authors point out that 
relationship oriented lenders have a ratio of bad loans lower than the average (Horoff and Korting, 
1998a; Ferri and Messori, 2000; Farinha and Santos, 2002). Other authors trace back the firms’ 
decision to a cost-benefit assessment: firms prefer to borrow from more than one bank to increase 
total leverage (Cosci e Meliciani, 2000) and credit availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; 
Bianco, 1997; Sapienza, 1997; Cole, 1998; Haroff and Korting, 1998a), to reduce the cost of debt 
(Rajan, 1992), and avoid liquidity problems due to banks’ behavior (Detragiache et al., 2000).On 
the other hand, it has been also recognized that often macroeconomic structural factors matter as 
well: for example, regional productive specialization, technology diffusion, degree of markets’ 
competition and institutional factor shave been deemed to be relevant in driving firms’ preferences, 
to the extent that they affect the financial market structure and shape differences in firms’ choices 
relative expected profitability. 
This paper adopts an approach emphasizing in particular the link among institutional quality 
and preferences about the number of firm-bank relationships. The role of institutions in influencing 
firms’ financial behaviouris largely acknowledged by the economic literature. In most cases, 
investigations deal with cross-country analysis, to explain differences in financial systems in the 
light of national institutional endowments (Chinn and Ito, 2006; Claessens and Leaven, 2003; 
Garretsen et al., 2004; Andrianova and Demetriades, 2004).  
However, in recent years, eminent contributions have focused on differences in institutional 
setting at local level recognising that even within a single country differences in institutional quality 
may be relevant, and play a crucial role in determining different firms’ choices. Thus it comes as no 
surprise, and there is extensive evidence thereof, that although the institutional framework mostly 
applies all over a country, its effectiveness is not the same in different areas (Guiso et al., 2004) 
because different quality of local institutions entails disparities in the rule of law, the provision of 
local public goods, the security of local property rights (Aron and Dell, 2010) and so on. Hence, a 
large strand of the literature has recognized an influence of institutionson small and medium sized 
enterprises (La Porta et al., 2010), i.e. those firms more conditioned by the different challenges, 
opportunities and constraints connected to the geographical context in which they are located 
(Pollard, 2003). In this vein, Demirguk-Kunt and Maksimovich (1998, 1999) arguethat financial 
policies of large and small firms are likely to be affected by institutional quality at a different layer: 
the former mainly influenced by national institutional assets, the latter by local institutional factors 
(la Rocca et. al, 2010). 
Evaluating the impact of institutional quality differences on firms’ choices is important for at 
least two reasons. First, it allows to single out the national or regional sources of firm behavior, so 
documenting patterns that comprehensive explanations of growth and development should strive to 
match. Second, it may signal the possible presence of inter-linkages between national and local 
determinants of firms’ financial decisions, which would necessitate of a more unified policy 
drawing.In this occurrence, the macro factors at local level such as the enforcement system, 
corruption, excessive bureaucratisation, poor or inefficient organisation of public services, lower 
endowment of infrastructures, lack of security, and an unsatisfactory social and cultural 
environment, are expected to be especially significant to explain the observed diversity in firm 
behaviour (Cheng and Shiu, 2007) over and above any relevant microeconomic factor. 
Addressingthe issue of the choice of number of banking relationship per firm in Italy hasa 
strong motivationin the evidence ofa long-lasting economic gap along with the deep divide in 
institutional endowment between Mezzogiorno and the rest of the country1. These relatively large 
differences match up with the evidence of large disparities occurring in a number of economic and 
                                                          
1 The term Mezzogiorno corresponds to the Southern regions plus the islands, namely Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, 
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. 
social indicators across different regions of the country (Malanima and Zamagni, 2010; Giannolaet 
al., 2016), which testify the multifaceted nature of the Southern lag and argue that even at the 
subnational level, differences in firms’ performance might be explained on the basis of differences in 
institutional quality endowment (Del Monte and Giannola, 1997; Scalera and Zazzaro, 2010; Erbetta 
and Petraglia, 2011; Nifo, 2011; Aiello et al., 2014). In particular, despite the increasing integration 
of the Italian financial system, its efficiency at local level is very different among regions (Guiso et 
al., 2004; Giordano, Imbriani and Lopes, 2013) and, although the same laws and regulations apply 
throughout the country, the enforcement system does differ at local level (Bianco et al., 2005). 
However, while in recent years a growing literature is focusing on the relationship between 
institutional quality and various indicators of firms’ performance(Agostino et al., 2016; Aiello and 
Ricotta, 2016; Ganau and Rodriguez-Pose, 2016; Mannarino et al., 2016; Di Liberto and Sideri, 2015; 
Lasagni et al, 2015; Nerozzi et al., 2015; Raspe and Van Oort, 2011; Fazio and Piacentino, 2010), the 
role of sub-national institutional quality on firms’ financial choices and, more specifically, on the 
number of bank relationshipsin Italian manufacturing industries,remains little explored. Among 
relevant exceptions, Sarno (2009) analyzes the relationship between the degree of enforcement at 
provincial level and the functioning of the financial system, confirming the role of local institutions 
in determining firms’ choices and local development. In the same vein, La Rocca et al. (2010) 
explain how local financial development and the connected institutional differences affect the 
financing decisions of Italian SMEs. Consistent with these findings, Agostino et al. (2010) show 
how better local institutions create a favorable business environment and a legal structure favouring 
a more effective credit protection,which in turn facilitate both firms to gain a better access to 
financial debt, and intermediaries to be more inclined to provide funds.Similarly, Ferri and Messori 
(2000), show that geographical differences in productive and socio-economic structures among 
Italian regions are paralleled by differences in the relationship banking patterns. Correlating the 
number of relationship banking with the socio-economic structure at local level, they find closer 
and longer-lasting customer relationships in Southern regions, where smaller banks and firms 
prevail. Even Cosci and Meliciani (2002) and Elsas (2002) investigating the determinants of the 
number of bank-lending per firm, find that the riskier business environment, the more firms engage 
in multiple banking relationships. Both the latter papers point out that contexts characterized by 
informational asymmetries, lack of transparency, higher uncertainty, corruption, excessive 
bureaucratization, lack of security and weak law enforcement – typically connected to poor 
institutional quality – give rise to incomplete contracts that encourage opportunistic behaviors and 
enhance the degree of contractual riskiness thus increasing the number of firm-bank relationships. 
Fitting in this strand of the literature, we aim to evaluate the role of local institutional quality in 
determining the number of firms’ banking relationships. In doing this, weadopt an approach 
emphasizing in particular the link among the number of banking relationships and the 
localinstitutional quality as measured by the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) constructed by Nifo 
and Vecchione (2014, 2015). This index evaluates institutional quality in Italian provinces and 
regions as a composite indicator derived by 24 elementary indexes grouped into five institutional 
dimensions (corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and 
accountability). 
To carry out the econometric analysis we build an unbalanced panel of 5,137 firms for the 
period 2003-2006, for a total of 16,460 observations, by matching qualitative and balance sheet 
datafrom the 9th and the 10thUniCredit-Capitalia surveys known as 
“IndaginisulleImpreseManifatturiere” and other data drawn fromBank of Italy andthe Italian 
national statistics institute ISTAT. Estimations are carried out by applying several different 
estimators: Probit, Poisson, Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM (System 
GMM), to address concerns of unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity. 
In different specifications, controlling for individual firm-levelcharacteristics and contextual 
variables conditioning firms’ performance, our robust results confirm that institutions matter as they 
prove to be one of the main drivers of firms’ choices about the number of bank relationships: we 
show that firms have more bank relationships in Southern Italian  provinces, as these are 
characterized by lower level of institutional quality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2deals with the methodology used for the 
empirical investigation. In particular, section 2.1 presents the model; section 2.2 focuses on our 
explanatory variables,i.e. controls (2.2.1) andthe IQI index (2.2.2). Section 2.3 illustrates the dataset 
and some descriptive statistics. Section 3provides the main empirical findings and the robustness 
analysis (section 3.1). The main conclusions are discussed in section 4.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This section is devoted to provide evidence about the factors driving the firm’s number of banking 
decisions in Italy, and in particular to single out the role of provincial institutional quality in 
determining this choice. To perform this task, we carry out an econometric analysis, where the 
number of bank relationships is the dependent variable and regressors represent individual firm’s 
features, bank-firm characteristics, local economic variables and institutional quality. Our 
investigation finds that an institutional improvement leads to lower shares of multiple borrowing 
firms, showing institutional quality negatively affects the number of banking relationship per firm. 
To properly address concerns of unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of some 
regressors, we alternatively adopt several estimation methods. 
 
2.1 ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND METHODS 
The firm’s choice to be multiple banked can be investigated by using various estimation models. 
First of all, it may be seen as a dichotomous choice (whether or not to be multiple banked), 
appropriately modeled through a binary response model. Alternatively, the number of bank 
relationships held by a firm can be considered as a count variable, hence another suitable model 
may be a count data model such as the Poisson model. Moreover, since the dependent variable tends 
to be persistent over time (the past number of banking relationships is likely to influence the present 
number), the SYS-GMM seems to be an appropriate model as well, since it also allows to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity and the presence of endogenous (or predetermined) explanatory 
variables. In the present paper we employ all the three mentioned models by estimating the following 
equations:  ܲ(�௜௝� = 1|�) = Φሺߙ + ߚଵ�ܳ�௝� + ߛ�′௜� + ��′� + �௜௝�ሻ                          (1) 
 �ܤܣ��௜௝� = ߙ + ߚଵ�ܳ�௝� + ߛ�′௜� + ��′� + ݒ௜௝�                             (2) 
 �ܤܣ��௜௝� = ߙ + ߚ଴�ܤܣ��௜,ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଵ�ܳ�௝� + ߛ�′௜� + ��′� + ݒ௜௝�                    (3) 
 
where indices i,  j and t refer to firms, provinces and time, respectively.   
In model (1), we adopt a Probit model: the dependent variable is a dummy �௜௝� assuming value 1 
if a firm i located in province j at time t holds a number of bank relationships strictly greater than 
one (and zero otherwise), and Φ is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution2. 
In models (2) and (3), the dependent variable NBANK is the number of per firm bank 
relationships. To estimate equations (2) and (3), we adopt the Poisson model and the Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM (SYS-GMM) estimators, respectively.  
On the right hand side of the models, we use first provincial IQI as our main explanatory 
variable, and then provincial IQI sub-indexes in place of the overall index. The vector X contains the 
potential determinants and control variables we introduce in the following sub-sections. 
                                                          
2 We consider as multiple banked all firms maintaining a number of bank relationships greater than 1, roughly 
corresponding to the seventh percentile of the distribution of the number of bank relationships in our sample. By 
contrast, Cosci e Meliciani (2002,2005) consider as multiple banked a firm maintaining a number of bank relationships 
greater than three and seven, respectively. 
In all equations, T is a set of time fixed effects while, for equations (2) and (3) ݒ௜௝� = �௜ + ݓ௝ +�௜� is a composite error, where �௜and ݓ௝summarize time-invariant unobserved firms’ characteristics 
and provincial fixed effects, and �௜�  captures idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ number of bank 
relationships. 
The results of estimations of equations (1), (2) and (3) are shown in the following Section 3. As 
we will see, they are remarkably robust to the choice of estimation method.  
 
2.2 THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Explanatory variables convey information on i) firms’ individual and bank-firm characteristics, 
such as size, age, indebtedness, credit rationing, duration of the relationship and share of debt held 
by the main bank; ii) macroeconomic conditions, i.e. the development of the local banking market 
and provincial GDP and the number of bank branches over total population; iii) provincial 
institutional quality considered both in terms of the overall value of IQI and the value of its single 
specific dimensions. 
 
2.2.1 CONTROLS 
The vector � of equations (1), (2) and (3) includes a number of different regressors concerning 
firms’ features, according to the various model specifications. To account for firm’s size,we 
consider the number of firm’s employees (EMP). Size is considered relevant to firms’ choice by a 
wide literature, arguing in favour of a positive impact on the number of bank relationships. That 
because, on one side, banks prefer to diversify credit risk by inducing large borrowers to engage in 
multiple relationships (Detragiache et al. 2000; Pelliccioni and Torluccio,2007), and on the other 
side, small firms avoid multiple relationships due to the existence of fixed costs of borrowing 
(Guiso and Minetti 2007). 
Besides, we comprise the firm’s age (AGE) among regressors as proxy of firms’ transparency, 
to acknowledge the greater possibility for lenders to access information relevant to gauge firm 
riskiness and reliability. More generally, the impact of firm’s age on multiple banking is 
controversial. A few studies argue that mature firms surviving the critical start-up phase and having 
a known history about past performance are less opaque and therefore may enjoy more and cheaper 
credit by a larger number of banks (Diamond,1991). On the contrary, other scholars state that being 
less subject to adverse selection, mature firms with a “track record” may prefer to maintain a 
smaller number of bank relationships (Detragiache et al. 2000).  
We also consider indicators of product/process and organizational innovation (INPP, INORG 
respectively), a dummy (HT) to take into account whether the firm belongs to a HiTech industry, 
and the ratio of intangible to total assets (INTAS). According to Elsas (2004), the firm’s attitude to 
innovate is a proxy of informational transparency. More innovative firms tend to prefer close 
banking relationships to avoid the diffusion of information to direct competitors (Yosha, 1995). On 
the other hand, they may prefer multiple relationships to prevent the hold up problem 3. Moreover, 
firms operating in high-tech sectors and with a higher ratio of intangible to total assets may be 
subjected to multiple-banking due to the propensity of banks to carry out a higher differentiation of 
credit to opaque firms (Pelliccioni and Torluccio, 2007). 
Concerning financial variables, we consider as additional regressor the ratio of financial 
liabilities to equity (LEVER), in accordance with the hypothesis that more leveraged firms establish 
a higher number of bank relationships (Carletti et al. 2004), also considering that the problem of 
adverse selection might be more severe for them than other firms (Detragiache et al. 2000). 
Variables accounting for credit rationing (CRED), duration of the relationship with the main bank 
(DURAT) and share of debt held by the main bank (MAIN) are also included. In order to minimize 
the risk of being credit rationed, firms may be more willing to establish and maintain multiple 
relationships (Detragiache et al. 2000); time duration and the relative weight of the main bank may 
be relevant too, considering that on one side asymmetric information problems are mitigated in the 
case of a single relationship (Sharpe 1990; Rajan,1992), and on the other side, a strong bargaining 
power of the main bank may push it to apply worse conditions to borrowers. 
Finally, local macroeconomic conditions are accounted for by including the variables RGDPC, 
the provincial indexes of per-capita real GDP, and BRANCH, i.e. the number of bank branches over 
total population. Through the first variable, we try to account for the fact that firms located in 
highly developed areas on one hand may need to establish more banking relationship to satisfy their 
needs of multiple financial services, and on the other hand may more easily finance their investment 
projects through internal financial resources, and not need to resort to many lenders. Even the 
impact of BRANCH is a priori ambiguous: indeed, if the presence of new banks in provincial credit 
markets induces better monitoring and screening processes, thus increasing soft information 
collected by intermediaries (Benfratello et al.,2008) multiple banking relationships may arise, but it 
is also true that a closer proximity can induce higher market power allowing banks to charge higher 
interest rates causing the hold up problem. 
Moreover, we include some other control variables to account for observable firm-specific 
characteristics. First, we control for firm belonging to a group (GROUP) or taking part in a 
consortium (CONS) which may involve less need to hold multiple relationships, thanks to the chance 
                                                          
3The hold up problem may arise in close banking relationships, as the main bank may take advantage from exclusive 
information and the consequent bargaining power, by practicing interest rates higher than the ones consistent with the 
real credit worthiness of the firm (Sharpe 1990, Rajan,1992). 
of receiving credit from other members, or benefitting from  a main bank financing all firms of the 
group/consortium (Detragiache et al., 2000). Second, we include the dummy variable COOP to 
ascertain if co-operative firms may hold a lower number of bank relationships given that they are 
generally financed by cooperative and popular banks with which they engage close banking 
relationships (Ferri and Messori, 2000; Cosci and Meliciani, 2005). Third, internationalized firms may 
need a higher number of bank relationships to manage their foreign transitions. Thus, we include the 
variable EXP coded one if a firm exports its products to foreign countries (and zero otherwise). Also, 
to check whether firms having more liquidity keep a lower number of bank relationships, we include 
the variable QUICK defined as the ratio of current asset and inventories to current liabilities. Finally, 
all estimations include industry dummies to control for heterogeneity at industry level (2-digit Ateco 
classification). 
The explanatory variables we employ in the econometric investigation are listed in the 
following Table 1, reporting also some main summary statistics.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
 
2.2.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INDEX (IQI) 
The last variables we employ are indicators of institutional quality, the focus of our analysis, proxied 
by the IQI index built by Nifo and Vecchione (2014, 2015) on a yearly basis, at the provincial 
(NUTS3) level. Inspired by the WGI framework (Kaufmann et al., 2011), IQI evaluates institutional 
quality in Italian provinces as a composite indicator derived by 24 elementary indexes grouped into 
five institutional dimensions (corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
voice and accountability). Appendix A reports the list of all elementary indexes employed and 
sources. Aggregate indicators for each of the five dimensions are derived from elementary indexes, 
and then from the latter the overall IQI index is similarly built up. The method used to obtain each 
upper-layer indicator from the lower layer ones develops in three phases: normalization, attribution of 
weights to each index and aggregation. Normalization consists in reformulating the original measure 
of indexes so as to have variation ranges included in the [0,1] interval. Weights are then assigned by 
applying a method known as Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980): starting from pairwise 
comparisons between indexes of the same layer, this technique turns verbal judgments on the relative 
importance of each index into a matrix of numerical values of importance. Then weights are assigned 
as the solution of a system generated by the eigenvector associated to the maximum eigenvalue of the 
matrix. Finally, upper layer aggregate indexes are computed as weighted averages of the lower layer 
ones. The analysis of the geographical pattern of IQI in Italy shows that, like for a broad range of 
socio-economic conditions, even for institutional quality a clear North-South divide emerges, since all 
regions of the South are characterised by lower levels of institutional quality than the rest of Italy4. 
 
2.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVESTATISTICS 
The empirical investigation is based on data coming from several sources. Firm-level information 
on Italian manufacturing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is drawn from the 9thand the 
10thissues of UniCredit-Capitalia survey “Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere”. Each issue refers 
to three years: the 9thsupplies data for 4289 firms for the period 2001-2003; the 10threports data for 
a panel of 4126 firms for the period 2004-2006. Information collected is both qualitative and 
quantitative: the year of establishment, group membership, size, industry, firm’s legal form. 
Information on the firm’s financial structure (such as the number and length of bank relationships) 
and balance sheet data are also provided 5. By matching survey and balance sheet data retrieved 
from both issues, we obtain an unbalanced panel of 5,137 firms and 16,460 observations6. We focus 
on Italian manufacturing SMEs, for which bank lending constitutes the major source of financing 
(Bank of Italy, 2007; European Commission, 2010), and thus we drop from our sample 240 firms, 
i.e. those with more than 250 workers and the ones listed on the Stock Exchange. 
To supplement this dataset, we also use data on the territorial distribution of branches for each 
Italian bank (Bank of Italy, 2010 and 2011) and provincial data for per capita GDP and industrial 
specialization (ISTAT, 2010 and 2011). Finally, we exploit the information on local institutional 
quality in Italian regions contained in the Institutional Quality Index (IQI) by Nifo and Vecchione 
(2014, 2015), described in the section above. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the number of bank relationships (mean, standard deviation, median, min 
and max values, and the distribution of firms for 1, 2, between 3 and 7 or more than 7 relations) 
respectively by regions and class of employees. 
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
As we can see, Table 2 indicates that at the national level sampled firms on average hold almost 
five bank relationships (4.96). About 20% of them have one or two bank relationships, 62.5% 
                                                          
4
 For details on IQI, see Nifo and Vecchione (2014) and https://sites.google.com/site/institutionalqualityindex/home to 
download the dataset. 
5As information about the number of lending banks (NBANK), the length of the relationship with the main bank 
(DURAT), and the share of the firm’s total bank debt held by the main bank (MAIN) is available only for the last year of 
each survey, we assign the same figure to the previous two years. In the presence of missing or inconsistent values, 
followingGambini and Zazzaro (2010) and Agostino et al. (2012), we impute suitable values for DURAT by taking the 
value reported for the last year of the first survey (2000) and adding the number 1 for 2001, the number 2 for 2002 and so 
on. 
6
 To meet econometrics requirements, we consider only a sample over four years. 
between three and seven and 17.5% more than seven. A striking evidence is that Northern (except 
Liguria) and Southern (except Abruzzo) regions show values lower than the national average. 
Conversely, for all the regions of Central Italy (except Lazio) the average number of bank 
relationships is well above the national average. Second, the regions with the highest share of firms 
with seven or more bank relationships are Umbria (34.69%)in the Centre, Abruzzo (20.87%) in the 
South and Friuli Venezia Giulia (20.19%) in the North. Third, as we can see in Figure 1, in most 
cases (Campania, Puglia, Lombardy, Sicily and Piedmont) the variability within each region is high, 
since some provinces show on average 7 or more firm-bank relationships, while others have less 
than 3-4. 
Table 3 shows that the number of bank relationship increase with firm’s size: firms with 1-9 
employees have 3 bank relationship, firms with 10-49 around 4.4 and firms with 50-250 around 6.3. 
A similar pattern emerges when looking at the distribution within each size class: firms choosing to 
have only 1 or 2 banks are 63%in the class 1-9 employees, 28% in the class 10-49 and only 12% in 
the size 50-250. Inversely, while 36% of firms belonging to the class 50-250 employees prefer to 
have more than 7 banks, only 13% in the size 10-49 and 6% in the size 1-9 share the same choice. 
Table 4 reports the average values of the IQI index (IQI_REG) and the number of banking per 
firm (NBANK) by regions in the 2006. Table 4 contrasts the number of bank relationships and the 
IQI overall indicator and sub-indexes; Table 5 shows  the correlation matrix among variables 
considered in Table 4: number of banks (NBANK), IQI at regional level (IQI_REG) and its 
dimensions (CORR, GOVERN, REGUL, RULAW, VOICE). 
[Table 4 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
Regions are sorted in Table 4, whence the institutional quality divide between the country’s North 
and South clearly emerges. Indeed, while the lowest 8 IQI scores are always associated with Southern 
regions, the highest 12 ones completely refer to regions located in Center-Northern regions. Both 
these results seem mainly driven by the values of rule of law (RULAW), government effectiveness 
(GOVERN) and the voice and accountability (VOICE), particularly weak in the Southern regions 
compared to the regions of Center-North. Conversely, the sub-index Corruption (CORR) seems to be 
characterized by values largely homogeneous in all regions of the country. 
To further explore the relationship between the variables of interest, Figures 1 and 2 report the 
mean values of bank relationships and IQI index, both computed at the province level.  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
3. RESULTS  
Table 6 reports the results obtained by estimating model (1), (2) and (3) with Probit, Poisson and 
SYS-GMM estimators, respectively. We report the estimations Probit and Poisson in pooled and 
panel form with relative marginal effects, needed for a more immediate interpretation of estimated 
coefficients 7 . For the SYS-GMM regressions, the estimated coefficients are reported 8 . All 
regressions are performed including provincial, year and sector fixed effects. The standard errors 
are clustered at province level (NUTS3) and consistent in the presence of any pattern of 
heteroskedasticity. 
Focusing on the results of the regression models obtained without considering the variable 
RGDPC (column 1), our variable of interest IQI (at the provincial level) is negative and statistically 
significant in most models. In particular, the results show that a better institutional quality decreases 
both the propensity to be multiple banked and the number of bank relationships for firms.  
[Table 6 here] 
Looking at the variables concerning firm-specific characteristics, we found that the variables 
EMP, AGE, LEVER, QUICK, HT, INPP and EXP, tend to be statistically significant at 1% level. In 
particular, it seems that larger, older, more leveraged, belonging to high-tech sectors, adopting 
product/process innovation, internationalized firms tend to be multiple banked9. On the opposite, 
firms characterized with a greater liquidity seem to be less prone to maintain multiple relationships. 
Looking then at the results concerning the characteristics of bank-firm relationship, the variables 
MAIN and CRED are statistically significant only for the Poisson regressions, indicating that an 
increase in the share of the debt granted by the main bank decreases the firm’s number of bank 
while rationed firms tend to maintain a greater number of bank relationships. Moreover, the positive 
coefficient of BRANCH - being positive and statistically significant for the Probit (panel) and SYS-
GMM regressions - indicates that a more developed local banking market might induce firms to 
                                                          
7To formally compare the pooled estimator with the panel estimator, we perform a likelihood-ratio test, showing that the 
panel (Probit and Poisson) estimators are appropriate. 
8According to Roodman (2009) the GMM estimator is appropriate when N is larger than the number of moment 
conditions. To meet this requirement, we consider a sample over four years imputing the year 2004 figures of the 
variables IQI to year 2003. This imputation may be acceptable as “it is reasonable to assume that the processes of 
institutional change occur slowly, and that appreciable changes in institutional quality occur only in the medium to 
long-term” (Nifo and Vecchione, 2014, pp. 6). For consistency, we use the same sample even for Probit and Poisson 
regressions. 
9In particular, to give a numerical interpretation of some variables, from the Poisson (pooled) estimates, the AGE marginal 
effect indicates that for each additional year of firm’s age, the number of bank relationships increases by 25%, when the 
other explicative variables are set at their mean value. Moreover, from the SYS-GMM estimates, the HT coefficient 
seems that firms belonging to Hi-Tech sectors increases their number of bank relationships by 38.2 %. 
establish multiple banking relationships. The other control variables are not statistically 
significant10. The results above discussed are substantially confirmed when employing the IQI at the 
regional level (IQI_REG). Therefore, for the sake of conciseness, these results are omitted and 
available on request. 
We run separate diagnostics test for Probit, Poisson and GMM model. For the Probit model we 
look for mis-specified functional form. As a whole, it seems the functional form of Φ is 
appropriate11. To test for the Poisson equidispersion assumption, we perform a likelihood ratio test 
of over-dispersion, showing no evidence of it. Regarding GMM estimations, the Hansen test accepts 
the null hypothesis of validity of the over-identifying restrictions, while the difference-in-Hansen 
test turns out to be not significant, thus supporting the validity of extra instruments used by the 
SYS-GMM estimator. Besides, the values of the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation in first and 
second differences (AB test AR1 and AB test AR2) tend to support the assumption of lack of 
autocorrelation in the errors in levels. 
An interesting question is whether the negative relationship between institutional quality and 
multiple banking could be specifically attributed to one or more of the dimensions included in the 
synthetic index. To study the possible different effects of each dimension composing IQI, we 
estimate five supplementary sets of regressions by using in turn one of the IQI dimensions as 
regressors instead of the overall index. Table 7 reports the results obtained by estimating model (1), 
(2) and (3) with the Probit, Poisson and SYS-GMM estimators, respectively12. Column 1 shows the 
output for each sub-index obtained when not including RGDPC. 
[Table 7 here] 
Focusing on the impact of the efficiency of the legal system on the probability to be multiple 
banked, we notice that the marginal effect of RULAW (Rule of Law) is negative and statistically 
significant (column 1, Probit pooled regression)13.  
To focus on the potential impact of government action on multiple banking, we replace IQI 
with its components GOVERN (Government Effectiveness ) and REGUL (Regulatory Quality). 
Table 7 shows that the variable GOVERN is negative and statistically significant in most models 
while REGUL is negative and statistically significant only in the case of the SYS-GMM estimator14.  
                                                          
10However, some variables do not always maintain their significance. In particular, for the SYS-GMM estimation, 
variables AGE, QUICK, INPP and EXP are not statistically significant. Besides, the variable INORG is statistically 
significant only for the Poisson (pooled) regression while the variable INTAS is statistically significant only for the 
Poisson regressions. Furthermore, the variable COOP is negative and statistically significant (Probit panel regression), 
indicating that co-operative firms seem to be less prone to maintain multiple relationships. 
11
 We assess the Probit functional form using parametric and semiparametric methods. 
12
 To economize on space in Table 7 we present all regressions of the above models showing only the marginal effects 
and the coefficients for the IQI subcomponents. 
13In particular, the probability of multiple banking decreases by about 11,5% as the rule of law indicator increases. 
14
 The variable GOVERN is not statistically significant only for the Probit (pooled) regression.  
Considering the presence of possible informal channels shaping bank-firm relationships, it is 
crucial to understand the effect of these latter on the firm’s choice of the number of bank 
relationships. To this aim, the IQI also represents aspects of informal institutions, i.e. VOICE 
(Voice and Accountability ) and CORR (Corruption). Since only the regressor VOICE comes out to 
be negative and statistically significant (Probit panel) the probability of multiple banking seems to 
decrease for higher values of social capital. 
The evidence we present on the Italian case seems to confirm the validity of our working 
hypothesis. As a matter of fact, our econometric investigation, controlling for  firms’ individual 
characteristics (size, age, leverage, export, hi-tech, etc.) , bank-firm characteristics (credit rationing, 
duration of the relationship and share of debt held by the main bank) and geographical variables 
(regional per capita GDP and the number of bank branches over total population), recognizes a 
significant role to institutional quality in the number of banking relationships. 
Our results show that institutional quality negatively influence multiple banking relationships. 
This is probably because good institutions may foster environments where banks and firms favourably 
interact to exchange information and promote close banking relationships. In other words, institutions 
may create good conditions in mitigating asymmetric information allowing firms and banks to catch 
all benefits deriving from close banking relationships. More in details, the institutional quality 
dimensions that appears significant are RULAW, GOVERN and VOICE. 
Regarding the relevance of Rule of Law (RULAW), the interpretation of this evidence hinges on 
the fact that “Transaction costs are far higher when property rights or the rule of law are not reliable. 
In such situations private firms typically operate on a small scale, perhaps illegally in an 
underground economy, and may rely on bribery and corruption to facilitate operations” (Aron, 
2000). This view is in line with the main theoretical and empirical literature that widely acknowledges 
the role of “Rule of Law” in fostering economic development and firms’ choices (Ayres, 1998; 
Buvinic and Morrison, 2000; Islam, 2003; Dam, 2006; World Bank, 2006; Lorentzen et. al, 2008; 
Nifo et al., 2016) meaning that institutional contexts characterized by a relatively high incidence of 
crime, tax evasion, shadow economy, poor law enforcement and higher judicial costs, negatively 
influence the firms’ propensity to maintain multiple  bank relationships. 
When considering the IQI dimension of Government Effectiveness (GOVERN), our results 
point out that the administrative capacity of local governments in terms of quality of policies and 
public services,  decreases the number of bank relationships and the firm’s propensity to be multiple 
banked. This highlight the impact of the intermediate government bodies (primarily local political 
and administrative institutions) play a more active and positive role, influencing also firms’ 
financial decisions. More effective public policies in health, waste management and environment, 
transport and education, are found to affect the business environment, reduce transaction costs and 
informational asymmetry (Kneller and Misch, 2010; Datta, 2008; Shirley and Winston, 2004), 
making easier close banking relationships. 
Finally, the results of regressions obtained with the significant IQI sub-index Voice and 
Accountability (VOICE) confirm the crucial role of social participation on the business 
environment and than on firms’ behaviour (Powell and Owen-Smith 2004; Sorenson 2003; Tallman 
et al. 2004). Particularly when the asymmetric information problem is severe, favourable social 
interactions might represent an indirect form of control to avoid opportunistic and anti-social 
behaviors leading banks and firms to establish close lending relationships being easier for banks to 
gain firm’s qualitative information and benefit from its use.  
When the IQI is respectively replaced by the sub-indexe Control and Corruption (CORR) we do 
not find significant effects on multiple banking relationships. The CORR sub-index  has the 
expected sign across all models (negative), but the coefficients are never statistically significant. 
According to other scholars, a possible explanation is that the level of corruption is quite similar 
across Italian regions (De Rosa et al., 2010; Lasagni et al., 2015; Nifo et al., 2016), and small 
differences are unlikely to be associated with differentials at firm level. 
 
3.1 ROBUSTNESS 
For robustness purposes, we carry out several sensitive checks of our findings. First, estimation is 
also made considering regional GDP per capita (RGDPC). Our findings (Table 6, column 2) are 
definitely robust and basically confirm the hypothesis that local institutional quality plays a 
significant role in determining firms’ choice of number of banking relationship15. As a matter of 
fact, once controlled for firms’ individual characteristics (size, age, leverage, export, hi-tech, etc.), 
bank-firm characteristics (credit rationing, duration of the relationship with the main bank and share 
of debt held by it) and the economic condition offirm’ province of origin (regional per-capita GDP 
and the number of bank branches over total population), we find that institutional quality is relevant 
to the choice of the number of banking, with relatively high marginal effects. 
As a second robustness check,we re-run all the models considering only the firms located in the 
Centre and North of Italyand including the variable RGDPC, where observations are more 
homogeneous in term of GDP and, hence, where the variation of GDP may be smaller. Again, as 
shown in Table 6, column 3, results are substantially unchanged16for the IQI at the regional level 
                                                          
15
 For the first robustness check, the variable IQI is not statistically significant for the Probit and Poisson (panel) 
regressions. Besides, in all models, the control variables confirm their sign and significance while the variable COOP is 
not longer statistically significant.    
16For the second robustness check, the variable IQI is not statistically significant for the Probit and Poisson (panel) 
regressions. Besides, in all models, the control variables confirm their sign and significance. 
(IQI_REG) and for all the control variables17. 
We carry out the robustness checks above, even considering each sub-index composing the IQI. 
Table 7, column 2 reports the results obtained including the variable RGDPC. They appear not 
systematically different from the above results18. As concerns the estimations considering the Centre 
and North of Italy including RGDPC (Table 7, column 3), the dimension RULAW gains 
significance even in the SYS-GMM regression, the variable GOVERN maintains its sign and 
significance for the Poisson (pooled) and SYS-GMM regressions; the dimensions VOICE and 
REGUL lose significance, while the dimension CORR becomes significant in the SYS-GMM 
regression showing a negative sign. 
Moreover, the results above discussed remain substantially unchanged when we substitute 
some control variables with alternative proxies (in detail, INTAS is replaced with TGAS; LEVER is 
substituted by BANKD; the control variable LIQUI is replaced by QUICK and FIND)19.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we investigate on the effect of provincial institutional quality trying to ascertain their 
magnitude and role on the number of banking relationships in Italian manufacturing firms for the 
period 2003-2006.In doing this, we measure the regional institutional quality by the IQI index, a 
composite indicator of provincial institutional quality derived by 24 elementary indexes grouped 
into five institutional dimensions (Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law, Voice and Accountability). 
The robust result, in line with our hypotheses, is consistent with most of the existing literature 
that ascribes a key role to the business environment and institutional context in determining firms’ 
behaviours. In our estimations, institutional quality turn out to explain a proportion of the variation 
left unexplained by firm and industry variables: we show that firms have more bank relationships in 
Southern Italian regions, as these are characterized by lower level of institutional quality. The results 
seem to suggest that the typical close banking relationship problems, such as the hold-up, the soft 
budget constraint and the liquidity problem may be mitigated in environments characterized by high 
institutional quality settings. Indeed, to avoid the hold up problem, a firm may put pressure to its 
opportunistic main bank by threatening it to interrupt the relationship moving to another bank. This 
could be a credible threatin high social capital context and efficient legal-financial and government 
systems, where moving to another bankis easier since information asymmetries are less and  
                                                          
17
 For the sake of conciseness, the results about the first and the second robustness checks considering the IQI_REG 
variable are omitted and available on request. 
18
 With respect to the regressions not including the variable RGDPC, the variable GOVERN loses significance for the 
Probit and Poisson (panel) regressions, the variable VOICE lose significance in the Probit (panel) regressions and the 
variable REGUL in the SYS-GMM regression. 
19This output is available upon request. 
exchangeability of information is promoted. The same may happen for the soft budget constraint 
problem: good institutions make it unprofitable for firms to behave in an antisocial way (e.g. 
practicing strategic default) since they may lost benefits deriving from networking. Similarly, the 
liquidity problem may be overcome as other banks could have easily access to firms’ information.  
More specifically we find that: 1)better local institutions are drivers of firms’ choices 
increasing their propensity to maintain single bank relationships; 2) considering the IQI sub-
indexes, the dimension RULAW, specifically accounting for aspects related to legal certainty, 
exerts a significant impact on firms banking decisions; the dimension GOVERN, summarizing the 
administrative capacity of local governments in terms of quality of policies and public services, 
decreases the number of bank relationships and the firm’s propensity to be multiple banked ; the 
sub-index VOICE, accounting for the social capital endowment at the local level, reduces the 
number of firm-banking relationships; 3) interestingly and - in some way - surprisingly, but in line 
with previous scholars, Corruption (CORR) did not emerge as having a robust impact on firms’ 
decisions. 
Firms’ decision of number of banking turns out to be affected by institutional features, suggesting 
that future research should carefully consider the possible consequences of alternative institutional 
settings on a variety of economic variables. The presence of invaluable spillovers connected to good 
quality institutions and the incentive mechanisms activated by them, is one of the main channels 
through which macroeconomic factors positively impact on the business environment, investment 
climate and competitiveness, suggesting to the policy makers a strategic tool (i.g. institutional and 
regulatory reform, especially in Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness” and “Voice and 
Accountability) to enhance the ability of lagging regions to capture development opportunities. 
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Tab. 1. Summary statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Description Years Obs Me
an 
Std
. 
Min Max 
D
NBANK Number of bank relationships per firm 2003,
2006 
1443
3 
4.7
84 
2.9
86 
0 15 
Fi
rm
's
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s  
EMP Number of firm’s employees 2003-
2006 
1486
2 
45.
39
45.
12
0 250 
AGE Current year  – year of foundation(in years) 2003-
2006 
1498
1 
25.
62
19.
53
0 110 
INPP Dummy =1 if firm innovations in product/ process, 0 
otherwise 
2003-
2006 
1525
0 
.58
3 
.49
3 
0 1 
INORG Dummy =1 if firm organizational innovations in 
product/ process, 0 otherwise 
2003-
2006 
1525
0 
.17
2 
.37
8 
0 1 
HT Dummy =1if firm belongs HiTech sector, 0 
otherwise 
2003-
2006 
1525
4 
.04
3 
.20
3 
0 1 
INTAS Intangible Fixed Assets/ tot.assets (in %) 2003-
2006 
1499
4 
2.3
67 
4.3
31 
0 25.4
5 TGAS (r 
check) 
Tangible Fixed Assets/ tot.assets (in %) 2003-
2006 
1477
4 
20.
99
15.
87
.579 67.3
0 LEVER Financial liabilities/(Financial liabilities+equity)(in 
%) 
2003-
2006 
1499
4 
27.
60
32.
64
0 96.3
9 BANKD (r 
check) 
Bank debt/total debt (in %) 2003-
2006 
1477
3 
20.
26
24.
15
0 77.1
6 QUICK Current asset - inventories/ current liabilities 2003-
2006 
1499
0 
1.0
75 
.93
9 
.233 21.5
7 LIQUI (r 
check) 
Current asset/ current liability 2003-
2006 
1477
0 
1.4
80 
1.1
57 
.506 26.5
2 FIND (r 
check) 
Equity/ total liabilities (in %) 2003-
2006 
1477
4 
25.
46
18.
44
1.07
6 
78.2
0 GROUP Dummy =1if the firm belongs to a group, 0 
otherwise. 
2003-
2006 
1525
0 
.17
2 
.37
7 
0 1 
CONS Dummy =1if firm belongs to a consortium, 0 
otherwise 
2003-
2006 
1513
3 
.03
8 
.19
2 
0 1 
COOP Dummy =1if the firm is co-operative, 0 otherwise 2003-
2006 
1510
7 
.01
2 
.11
1 
0 1 
EXP Dummy =1if the firm has exported in whole or in 
part its products to foreign countries, 0 otherwise 
2003-
2006 
1524
5 
.62
0 
.48
5 
0 1 
Ba
n
k-
 
 
 
CRED Dummy =1 if the firm whished more credit at the 
same interest rate agreed with the bank, 0 otherwise 
2003-
2006 
1275
5 
.05
9 
.23
7 
0 1 
DURAT Duration of the relationship with the main bank(in 
years) 
2003,
2006 
1205
4 
15.
99
11.
42
0 53 
MAIN Share of the debt hold by the main bank (in %) 2003,
2006 
9649 24.
49
24.
40
0 100 
Co
n
te
x
t c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s 
 
BRANCH Number of branches for province/ provincial 
population 
2003-
2006 
1525
4 
6.4
33 
1.4
73 
2.19
3 
10.4
9 RGDPC Provincial real GDP (per capita)(in thousands of €) 2003-
2006 
1525
4 
20
21
40
33.
9086
.10 
274
14.3IQI Institutional quality index at the provincial level 2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.71
1 
.14
8 
0 1 
IQI_REG 
 
Institutional quality index at the regional level 
 
2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.70
9 
.13
8 
.097
3 
.932 
RULAW IQI Dimension, Rule of Law  at the provincial level 2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.59
0 
.16
4 
0 1 
GOVERN IQI Dimension, Government at the provincial level 2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.42
2 
.13
3 
0 1 
REGUL IQI Dimension, Regulatory Quality at the provincial 
level 
2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.62
0 
.17
3 
0 1 
VOICE IQI Dimension, Voice & Accountability at the 
provincial level 
2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.50
5 
.21
8 
0 1 
CORR IQI Dimension, Corruption at the provincial level 2004-
2006 
1436
8 
.84
9 
.14
2 
0 1 
  
Tab. 2. Number of bank relationships by region 
Region Mean Sd Median min max 1 2 3-7 > 7 total 
Piedmont 4.562 3.046 4 1 15 8.27% 20.21% 58.36% 13.16% 100.00% 
Valle D’Aosta 3.625 2.163 4.5 1 6 37.50% 0.00% 62.50% 0.00% 100.00% 
Lombardy 4.947 3.040 4 1 15 6.26% 14.16% 62.36% 17.22% 100.00% 
Trentino A.A. 4.262 3.159 3 1 15 9.45% 22.44% 59.06% 9.06% 100.00% 
Veneto 4.870 2.681 4 1 15 4.93% 11.57% 66.37% 17.13% 100.00% 
Friuli V.G. 5.406 2.894 5 1 15 4.00% 9.71% 66.10% 20.19% 100.00% 
Liguria 4.914 3.196 4 1 15 10.40% 12.14% 61.85% 15.61% 100.00% 
Emilia Romagna 5.489 3.242 5 0 15 5.81% 9.92% 61.33% 22.95% 100.00% 
Tuscany 5.212 2.804 5 1 15 5.98% 9.25% 66.07% 18.70% 100.00% 
Umbria 6.501 3.628 6 1 15 2.04% 5.10% 58.16% 34.69% 100.00% 
Marche 5.297 2.845 5 1 15 6.95% 7.44% 65.38% 20.22% 100.00% 
Lazio 4.349 3.136 4 1 15 8.76% 24.09% 54.01% 13.14% 100.00% 
Abruzzo 5.197 3.108 5 1 15 7.28% 10.92% 60.92% 20.87% 100.00% 
Molise 4.375 3.252 3 1 12 6.25% 25.00% 50.00% 18.75% 100.00% 
Campania 4.379 2.705 4 1 15 9.09% 16.26% 63.11% 11.54% 100.00% 
Puglia 4.668 3.111 4 1 15 12.13% 12.13% 58.20% 17.53% 100.00% 
Basilicata 3.465 1.084 4 1 5 7.50% 7.50% 85.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Calabria 3.047 1.690 3 1 7 11.54% 34.62% 53.85% 0.00% 100.00% 
Sicily 4.674 3.679 4 1 15 13.18% 13.18% 55.74% 17.91% 100.00% 
Sardinia 3.847 2.424 3 1 15 11.11% 16.67% 66.67% 5.56% 100.00% 
Italy 4.963 3.024 4 0 15 6.76% 13.30% 62.40% 17.54% 100.00% 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 3. Number of bank relationships by class of employees 
Employees Mean sd median min max 1 2 3-7 > 7 Total 
1-9 3.038 2.160 2 1 13 30.87% 32.10% 30.76% 6.26% 100.00% 
10-49 4.395 2.471 4 0 15 8.25% 19.13% 59.36% 13.27% 100.00% 
50-250 6.341 3.472 6 1 15 3.85% 8.44% 51.43% 36.29% 100.00% 
 
  
Tab. 4. Bank relationships and regional IQI: overall indicator and sub-indexes 
Region NBANK  IQI_Reg CORR GOVERN REGUL RULAW VOICE 
Piedmont 4.567   0.720 0.911 0.431 0.589 0.636 0.444 
Valle D’Aosta 3.625  0.770 0.852 0.311 0.785 0.748 0.594 
Lombardy 4.950  0.788 0.810 0.510 0.637 0.567 0.635 
Trentino A.A. 4.264  0.840 0.929 0.446 0.854 0.766 0.455 
Veneto 4.870  0.700 0.927 0.452 0.712 0.559 0.408 
Friuli V.G. 5.417  0.715 0.771 0.516 0.562 0.500 0.375 
Liguria 4.931  0.519 0.760 0.394 0.410 0.313 0.571 
Emilia Romagna 5.489  0.718 0.963 0.429 0.759 0.474 0.589 
Tuscany 5.213  0.880 0.913 0.451 0.722 0.854 0.518 
Umbria 6.493  0.672 0.959 0.331 0.577 0.672 0.425 
Marche 5.284  0.661 0.895 0.299 0.675 0.635 0.432 
Lazio 4.360  0.638 0.825 0.239 0.367 0.691 0.546 
Abruzzo 5.216  0.620 0.845 0.172 0.578 0.822 0.383 
Molise 4.375  0.337 0.645 0.068 0.385 0.506 0.316 
Campania 4.399  0.328 0.412 0.199 0.231 0.546 0.200 
Puglia 4.670  0.463 0.763 0.244 0.287 0.598 0.274 
Basilicata 3.450  0.477 0.698 0.182 0.353 0.659 0.304 
Calabria 3.154  0.125 0.511 0.156 0.156 0.147 0.170 
Sicily 4.723  0.278 0.639 0.166 0.262 0.383 0.225 
Sardinia 3.847  0.404 0.782 0.171 0.454 0.428 0.443 
Italy 4.969   0.709 0.850 0.423 0.620 0.590 0.506 
 
 
Tab. 5.Correlation Matrix 
 
NBANK IQI_REG IQI CORR GOVERN REGUL RULAW VOICE 
NBANK 1 
       IQI_REG 0.046 1 
      IQI 0.041 0.926 1 
     CORR 0.053 0.475 0.435 1 
    GOVERN 0.026 0.617 0.699 0.153 1 
   REGUL 0.050 0.637 0.627 0.510 0.333 1 
  RULAW 0.011 0.353 0.349 0.325 -0.158 0.047 1 
 VOICE 0.010 0.404 0.486 -0.094 0.405 0.372 -0.405 1 
 
  
Table 6: Effect of IQI on Multiple Banking Relationships 
 COLUMN 1  
(NO RGDPC) 
COLUMN 2 
(WITH RGDPC) 
COLUMN 3 
(CENTRE-NORTH WITH RGDPC) 
   
 PROBITa POISSONb SYS-
GMMb 
PROBIT a POISSONb SYS-
GMMb 
PROBITa POISSONb SYS-
GMMb 
  pooled panel pooled panel  pooled panel pooled panel  pooled panel pooled panel  
 Institutions                   
IQI -0.106** -0.062*** -1.220* -0.183 -1.710*** -0.097* -0.022 -1.225* -0.183 -1.525** -0.096* -0.002 -1.197* -0.179 -1.608* 
  0.045 0.006 0.061 0.429 0.001 0.080 0.478 0.061 0.429 0.032 0.095 0.906 0.078 0.458 0.056 
Firm’s characteristics 
 
               
EMP 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.704*** 0.137*** 0.243*** 0.048*** 0.028*** 0.704*** 0.137*** 0.250*** 0.045*** 0.012*** 0.720*** 0.139*** 0.267*** 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.0008 
AGE 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.253*** 0.051*** -0.0360 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.253*** 0.051*** -0.0335 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.195*** 0.038*** -0.0526 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.583 0.007 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.384 
LEVER 0.002*** 0.0009*** 0.026*** 0.005*** 0.00779*** 0.002*** 0.0007*** 0.026*** 0.005*** 0.00792*** 0.002*** 0.0005*** 0.027*** 0.005*** 0.005* 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 
INTAS 0.002 0.0004 0.018* 0.004* -0.0047 0.002 0.001 0.018* 0.004* -0.00225 0.002 0.0003 0.019* 0.004* -0.00513 
  0.168 0.419 0.062 0.058 0.634 0.171 0.277 0.062 0.058 0.815 0.259 0.426 0.076 0.061 0.615 
QUICK -0.024*** -0.008*** -0.235** -0.039*** -0.0311 -0.024*** -0.006*** -0.235** -0.039*** -0.0381 -0.026*** -0.004*** -0.255** -0.041*** -0.038 
  0.001 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.633 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.559 0.002 0.017 0.023 0.000 0.508 
GROUP -0.012 -0.009 -0.091 -0.021 0.0310 -0.012 -0.006 -0.091 -0.021 0.0599 -0.021 -0.006 -0.125 -0.028 0.0179 
  0.499 0.267 0.536 0.364 0.881 0.497 0.480 0.536 0.364 0.766 0.246 0.193 0.417 0.265 0.930 
CONS -0.003 -0.009 0.146 0.019 0.0641 -0.003 -0.009 0.146 0.019 0.0617 0.017 0.010 -0.032 -0.023 -0.0351 
  0.930 0.433 0.600 0.687 0.700 0.930 0.434 0.600 0.688 0.707 0.624 0.365 0.914 0.666 0.813 
HT 0.102*** 0.060*** 1.048*** 0.151** 0.382*** 0.102*** 0.054** 1.048*** 0.151** 0.353** 0.107*** 0.049** 1.190*** 0.180*** 0.318** 
  0.006 0.007 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.006 0.024 0.000 0.019 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.000 0.007 0.026 
INORG 0.023 0.010 0.197** 0.026 0.101 0.023 0.004 0.197** 0.026 0.0998 0.019 0.001 0.187* 0.024 0.0607 
  0.247 0.310 0.048 0.185 0.452 0.248 0.590 0.048 0.185 0.449 0.340 0.695 0.081 0.248 0.642 
INPP 0.028** 0.017*** 0.266*** 0.045*** 0.194 0.028** 0.013** 0.266*** 0.045*** 0.191 0.030** 0.007* 0.239** 0.042** 0.229* 
  0.024 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.132 0.024 0.020 0.005 0.008 0.134 0.029 0.089 0.022 0.020 0.086 
EXP 0.034** 0.030*** 0.461*** 0.087*** 0.237 0.033** 0.027*** 0.461*** 0.087*** 0.197 0.031* 0.012** 0.477*** 0.090*** 0.200 
  0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.272 0.049 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.362 0.088 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.343 
COOP -0.040 -0.031 0.051 -0.010 -0.0784 -0.040 -0.044 0.051 -0.010 -0.0346 -0.092 -0.027 -0.010 -0.010 -0.00813 
  0.584 0.142 0.929 0.910 0.701 0.583 0.177 0.929 0.910 0.863 0.288 0.238 0.989 0.919 0.973 
NBANK_l     0.732***     0.735***     0.762*** 
      0.000     0.000     0.000 
Bank-firm relationships 
characteristics 
 
               
CRED -0.001 -0.0003 0.644*** 0.097*** 0.162 -0.001 0.0008 0.644*** 0.097*** 0.155 -0.004 -0.002 0.595*** 0.087*** 0.315 
  0.979 0.978 0.000 0.001 0.365 0.981 0.949 0.000 0.001 0.383 0.917 0.707 0.003 0.005 0.104 
DURAT 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.0001 0.00273 0.000 -0.0001 0.002 0.000 0.00215 0.000 0.00003 0.003 0.001 0.000552 
  0.867 0.985 0.756 0.640 0.668 0.869 0.873 0.756 0.639 0.737 0.674 0.886 0.503 0.383 0.925 
MAIN -0.000 -0.00003 -0.006*** -0.001** -0.00370 -0.000 -0.00007 -0.006*** -0.001** -0.00323 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.008*** -0.001*** -0.002 
  0.418 0.642 0.001 0.016 0.298 0.418 0.610 0.001 0.016 0.359 0.288 0.182 0.000 0.004 0.544 
Context characteristics 
 
               
BRANCH -0.034 0.012*** -0.426 -0.039 0.0546* -0.036 0.011* -0.424 -0.039 0.0338 -0.035 0.006** -0.407 -0.034 -0.0483 
  0.576 0.000 0.194 0.714 0.079 0.565 0.073 0.197 0.717 0.323 0.592 0.022 0.255 0.756 0.272 
RGDPC      -0.140 -0.070** 0.078 0.012 0.355 -0.208* -0.050** -0.194 -0.018 0.491 
       0.225 0.036 0.898 0.967 0.472 0.066 0.013 0.798 0.956 0.302 
Constant     0.814**     -2.673     -3.230 
     0.029     0.545     0.438 
PROVINCIAL FE YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
N 5687 5687 5687 5687 6,381 5687 5687 5687 5687 6,381 5011 5011 5011 5011 5,611 
Number of id     2,812     2,812     2,476 
Log pseudolikelihood -2105.878 -1180.414 -12256.36 
 
-11780.62  -2105.656 -1183.236 -12256.36 -11780.63  -1855.853 -1038.690 -10820.73 -10403.44  
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0     1.11 
0.146 
    1.11 
0.146 
    0.53 
0.232 
  
                
AB test for AR(1)  
 
    -8.547 
0.000 
    -8.640 
0.000 
    -8.623 
0.000 
AB test for AR(2)    
 
    -0.967 
0.333 
    -1.008 
0.313 
    -0.416 
0.677 
Hansen test     295.2 
0.160 
    300.4 
0.418 
 
    291.6 
0.561 
Difference-in-Hansen tests     30.00 
0.224 
    26.63  
0.374 
    29.09 
0.260 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.For the description of the variables see Table 1. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. a The dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if firms maintain a number 
of banking relationships greater or equal two, zero otherwise. bThe dependent is the number of banking relationships for a firm. For the Probit and Poisson regressions the marginal effects are reported. The standard errors (not reported) are clustered at 
province (NUTS3) level and consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity.To avoid the influence of potential outliers, we winsorize some variables at 1% level. In performing the Probit and Poisson regressions, all potential endogenous and 
predetermined variables are lagged one year. EMPLOY, AGE, and RGDPC are in logarithms. All estimations include ATECO, sector dummies and year fixed effects. We report the AB test for AR(1) and AB test for AR(2) stand for Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in first differences and Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences, respectively. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The null hypothesis of the difference in Hansen test is that the 
additional instruments used by the SYS-GMM estimator are valid. 
 
 TABLE 7 : Effect of IQI Sub-indexes on Multiple Banking Relationships:  
 COLUMN 1  
(NO RGDPC) 
COLUMN 2  
(WITH RGDPC) 
COLUMN 3  
(CENTRE-NORTH WITH RGDPC) 
 
   
 PROBITa POISSONb SYS-
GMMb 
 
PROBIT a POISSONb SYS-
GMMb 
PROBITa POISSONb SYS-
GMMb 
  pooled panel pooled panel  
 
pooled panel pooled panel  
 
pooled panel pooled panel  
                             
RULAW -0.115*** 0.027 -0.358 -0.011 -0.114 -0.100*** -0.026 -0.370 -0.018 -0.870 -0.080** -0.001 -0.511 -0.008 -1.295* 
 0.002 0.104 0.328 0.945 0.601 0.007 0.176 0.335 0.913 0.150 0.028 0.895 0.256 0.964 0.074 
GOVERN -0.031 -0.059** -1.360** -0.152* -1.420*** -0.038 -0.025 -1.367** -0.163 -1.850*** -0.085 -0.011 -1.376** -0.201 -2.663*** 
  0.576 0.025 0.012 0.054 0.0002 0.509 0.422 0.011 0.499 0.0003 0.151 0.617 0.030 0.453 1.31e-05 
VOICE 0.007 -0.080*** 0.349 0.054 0.382 0.027 -0.041* 0.357 0.050 0.325 0.063 -0.005 0.149 0.112 -0.493 
  0.912 0.000 0.356 0.821 0.322 0.680 0.065 0.356 0.837 0.199 0.344 0.666 0.743 0.115 0.530 
REGUL 0.049 -0.019 0.364 -0.047 -2.187** 0.064 0.038 0.364 -0.002 -0.0386 0.106 0.014 0.189 -0.012 -0.005 
  0.523 0.392 0.641 0.883 0.014 0.409 0.174 0.641 0.981 0.929 0.245 0.463 0.814 0.881 0.989 
CORR -0.055 -0.003 0.477 -0.012 -0.667 -0.060 -0.007 0.477 -0.011 -0.813 -0.088 -0.010 1.019 0.029 -1.826** 
  0.366 0.853 0.211 0.954 0.271 0.332  0.751 0.211 0.961 0.200 0.387 0.620 0.158 0.933 0.034 
PROVINCIAL FE YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.For the description of the variables see Table 1. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. Table 7 reports only IQI sub-indexes and not full 
results (available upon request). a The dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if firms maintain a number of banking relationships greater or equal two, zero otherwise. bThe dependent is the number of banking relationships for a firm. 
For the Probit and Poisson regressions the marginal effects are reported. The standard errors (not reported) are clustered at province (NUTS3) level and consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity.To avoid the influence 
of potential outliers, we winsorize some variables at 1% level. In performing the Probit and Poisson regressions, all potential endogenous and predetermined variables are lagged one year. EMPLOY, AGE, and RGDPC are in logarithms. All 
estimations include ATECO, sector dummies and year fixed effects. We report the AB test for AR(1) and AB test for AR(2) stand for Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences and Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences, respectively. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The null hypothesis of the difference in Hansen test is that the additional instruments used by the SYS-GMM estimator 
are valid. 
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Fig. 1 Average number of bank relationships in the Italian provinces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Average Institutional Quality Index (IQI) in the Italian provinces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
